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Agricultural cooperatives have a long tradition in the European Union, and in 
recent years they have been rising in number. Cooperatives may offer various 
advantages such as improving the bargaining power of farmers, stabilising 
prices, allowing economies of scale to be exploited, or offering guarantees with 
regard to quality. The aim here is to see how far agricultural cooperatives could 
play a role in helping one of the applicant countries, Cyprus, prepare for, EU 
membership.1
When Cyprus2 joins the EU its agriculture will have to compete in a 
Community-wide single market. Adopting the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) is likely to lead to increases in prices for many agricultural products. 
Higher prices impose a burden on consumers and the food industry using 
agricultural inputs. The key to offsetting the negative consequences of increases 
in farm gate prices, and enabling Cypriot farmers and food industries to 
withstand the additional competitive pressures of an enlarged EU, is to increase 
efficiency. This would also enable Cypriot agriculture to overcome some of the 
drawbacks of a dry climate, and small, fragmented farms. The aim here is to 
assess how far cooperatives could assist Cyprus in this task.
When Cyprus joins the EU, the mechanisms used for agricultural policy 
will have to be brought in line with those of the CAP. This entails introducing 
certain new institutions, such as the organisation of producer groups in sectors 
such as fruit and vegetables, and abolishing others such as the marketing 
boards.3 Cooperatives could play a role in facilitating this process of 
adjustment.
'This paper was prepared for a seminar organised by the European Institute of Cyprus (EIC) 
attended inter alia by representatives of Cypriot agricultural cooperatives and cooperative 
banks. I would like to thank the EIC for their invitation, and for the lively discussions which 
ensued. The usual disclaimer of course applies.
2In 1987 the EU signed a customs union agreement with the government of Cyprus on behalf 
of the whole island. This is expected to happen with accession, even though the Government 
of Cyprus cannot give any guarantee of the acquis communautaire being adopted in the 
Turkish part of the island (Pattichis, 1999).The acquis communautaire is the body of EU 
legislation, practices, principles, and objectives accepted by the member states. It is composed 
of the Treaties (and, most importantly, the Treaties of Rome, the Single European Act, the 
Maastricht Treaty and, following ratification, the Amsterdam Treaty); legislation enacted at 
the EU level and judgements of the European Court of Justice; Justice and Home Affairs; 
Foreign and Security Policy and Treaties of the EU with third countries. The acquis has been 
accumulating over the years and now amounts to some 12,000 legislative acts.
’Marketing boards are semi-government agencies responsible for ensuring adequate domestic 



























































































In order to illustrate how this is the case Section 2 describes the main 
characteristics of agricultural cooperatives, while Sections 3 and 4 deal with the 
EU experience of cooperatives and producer organisations respectively. Section 
5 indicates some of the difficulties encountered by agricultural cooperatives in 
the EU. Sections 6 and 7 describe the main features of Cypriot agricultural 
production and trade, while Section 8 indicates how the agricultural policies 
adopted in Cyprus would have to be brought in line with EU market 
organisations. Section 9 discusses the experience of cooperatives in Cyprus, 
before reaching conclusions about how cooperatives could help Cyprus to 
prepare for EU accession in Section 10.
2. The Characteristics of Agricultural Cooperatives
Following Bonin, Jones and Putterman (1993, p. 1291), cooperatives can be 
defined by their free and voluntary membership, and by having three 
charcteristics associated with worker control: participation in firm decision­
making (including the appointment of management), profit-sharing, and 
employee ownership.4 Though the internal rules and policies of cooperatives 
vary considerably, certain common practices can be identified.5 In particular, a 
certain percentage of the surplus (i.e. revenues in excess of costs, including 
contractual wage payments) is distributed to the members as "bonus" payments 
in all cooperatives.6 After wages and other costs are paid, the remaining surplus 
may be divided between individual capital accounts, and a collective capital 
fund. In most cooperatives the bulk of capital financing for investment tends to 
come from the collective capital funds.
As van Bekkum and van Dijk et al (1997) argue, the long tradition of 
cooperatives in the agricultural sector, can be explained by certain intrinsic 
characteristics of agriculture and rural life.7 For the most part farms are small 
relative to their industrial counterparts, while the food processing and farm 
input industries are often highly concentrated. Consumers of food products are 
becoming increasingly concerned about the safety, quality and variety of 
foodstuffs. The dependence of agriculture on climate and biological factors 
inevitably leads to uncertainties in the quantity and quality of supply. The
4The definition of cooperatives evolved by the US Department of Agriculture in the 1980s 
which is widely used (also by van Bekkum and van Dijk eds., 1997) defines these 
characteristics in slightly different terms: a cooperative as a firm which is controlled by its 
users, owned by its users, and which distibutes benefits on the basis of use.
5See also Bartlett and Uvalic (1986).
6Members are rarely paid interest on their shares, but instead receive these equity gains.
’These authors maintain that the usefulness of cooperatives in agriculture is likely to remain 
precisely because it depends on these structural features of agriculture and rural life. However, 
this does not means that agricultural cooperatives will remain unchaged in their present form, 



























































































nature of agricultural production means that farmers are geographically 
dispersed, and often far from markets.
Agricultural cooperatives are said to offer various advantages:8
• They may improve the bargaining power of farmers relative to input 
suppliers and processors so enabling market outlets to be guaranteed, 
and margins to be enhanced.
• Cooperatives may permit farmers to exploit economies of scale.
• They may provide an institutional framework for preventing prices 
from falling too low as a result of excess supply, and help farmers to 
cope with the uncertainty arising from the dependence of agriculture on 
climate and biological factors.
• Cooperatives may permit access to new markets.
• Cooperatives for marketing and processing may enable improvements 
in quality, in particular for products subject to considerable variability 
such as fruit and vegetables. Increasingly cooperatives tend to impose 
strict standards and controls on the quality of their products, and in 
some cases provide certification concerning the origin of the product.
• The formation of cooperatives may create employment, and raise the 
incomes of farmers.
• At times the formation of cooperatives has been favoured for political 
or social motives.9
• It is also argued that cooperatives may offer transaction-cost 
advantages as a means over overcoming opportunism and hold-ups. 
With regard to transaction costs, Williamson (1981) has argued that 
organisations may incur high costs if they have asset-specific 
investments and encounter opportunistic behaviour on the part of their 
partners. Both farmers and food processors have a high share of 
investments in specific assets, i.e. assets with a very low value in 
alternative uses. Both are therefore vulnerable to opportunistic
8The argument that cooperatives increase productivity by improving incentives, which is 
central to the literature on industrial cooperatives (see, for example, Bonin, Jones and 
Putterman (1993)) appears less often in the literature on EU agricultural cooperatives as these 
are mainly concerned with upstream and downstream activities.
9For instance Giacomini, Bonomi, and Martorana (1996) describe how this was the case in 




























































































behaviour, which might be reflected in the terms or renewal of contract, 
or in the fixing of prices. Cooperatives may offer advantages in enabling 
more trustworthy partners to be chosen, or binding contractual relations 
in statutory arrangements (Kyriakopoulos and van Bekkum, 1999).
• Cooperatives may help to address the problems of asymmetric 
information regarding the safety and quality of food, and the compliance 
of production methods with objectives such as protecting the 
environment, or respecting animal welfare. Asymmetric information is a 
type of market failure in which there is an asymmetry of information 
between buyer and seller (Akerlof, 1970). Many goods produced by the 
agri-food industry can be defined as "credence goods", as their quality 
cannot be discerned by consumers before or after they are purchased 
(Caswell and Mojduska, 1996). As consumers are unable to distinguish 
the quality good, they may choose the lower quality good and, by 
Gresham's law, drive those of higher quality from the market (Blandford 
and Fulponi, 1999). Cooperatives may play a role in ensuring that 
consumers are guaranteed the product that they expect.
3. Agricultural Cooperatives in the EU
In the EU cooperative arrangements in agriculture generally relate to marketing 
and processing activities, or farm inputs and the provision of credit rather than 
the actual production process (see Tables 1 and 2). Investment in upstream or 
downstream activities is generally beyond the financial means of individual 
farmers, so farmers band together in joint vertical integration.
Despite difficulties in measurement (also due to the variety of activities 
in which cooperatives are involved) the use of agricultural cooperatives seems 
to be in expansion in the EU,10 in particular, in Germany with the 
transformation of over a thousand former state-owned farms into cooperatives. 
Cooperatives continue to be organised on a national basis, thought some have 
foreign members,11 and many are active on international markets.
Cooperatives concerned with marketing and processing can be divided into 
"first-stage" cooperatives which buy from the farmer, and which may carry out 
initial processing, and second stage cooperatives, or confederations, which may 
coordinate the marketing of a number of first-stage cooperatives and carry out 
further processing.
10Van Bekkum and van Dijk et al (1997)
"For instance, the German dairy cooperatives have Belgian members, while British fruit and 
vegetable cooperatives have admitted Spanish members in order to increase the variety of 




























































































Table 1: Agricultural Cooperatives in the EU in 1996
Number of cooperatives Number of members Turnover of 
cooperatives 
1000 ECU
Belgium n.a n.a n.a
Denmark 214 113,000 12.1
Germany 3,950 3,280,000 39.3
Greece 6,919 728,000 0.85
Spain 4,350 950,000 6.3
France 3,618 720,000 52.6
Ireland 128 186,000 9.59
Italy* 8,850 1,124,000 16.45
Lux. 25 n.a. 0.12
Netherlands* 251 273,000 22.4
Austria 1,757 2,182,000 n.a.
Portugal 909 800,000 1.27
Finland 403 1,228,500 7.59
Sweden 50 300,000 8.24
UK 506 271,000 7.66
Source: van Bekkum and van Dijk et al (1997) 
*1995
In recent years there has been a decline in the number of these second stage 
cooperatives or confederations in the EU due to problems of coordination and 
control, which result in a loss of competitiveness vis-à-vis individual 
cooperatives (van Bekkum and van Dijk eds., 1997). This tendency has been 
reinforced by the spate of mergers and acquisitions by first-stage cooperatives 
in EU countries aimed at increasing competitiveness.
Some cooperatives have tried to increase the income of their members by 
shifting to the production of goods with higher value added, and this frequently 
leads to vertical integration or the development of own brand names. 
Increasingly cooperatives recognise the importance of market orientation and 
the development of specialised regional products. None the less, in volume 
terms most agricultural cooperatives continue to deal with products which have 
not been processed, or only partially so.
In the EU cooperatives for the marketing and processing of agricultural 
products have played an important role in sectors such as milk, fruit and 
vegetables, wine, and olive oil. As shown in Table 3, in some countries 
cooperatives have also been significant in sectors such as cereals, and pigmeat. 
In general, however, as the Table illustrates, the share of agricultural produce 
sold through cooperatives tends to be lower in Mediterranean countries, and, as 





























































































Table 2: The 20 Main Agricultural Cooperatives in the EU (1995)
c o o p e r a t iv e c o u n t r y p r o d u c t  g r o u p tu r n o v e r  
1 0 0 0  E C U
n u m b e r  o f  
m e m b e r s
n u m b e r  o f  
e m p lo y e e s
i .  B a y w a G e r m a n y m u lt i ­
fu n c t io n a l
3 ,5 4 2 ,0 0 0 n .a . 1 0 ,7 9 4
2 . M c ts a l i i t t o F in la n d w o o d 3 ,1 3 3 ,0 0 0 1 1 7 ,7 8 3 n .a .
3 . C a m p in a  
M e lk u n ie
N L d a ir y  p r o d u c ts 3 ,1 0 0 ,0 0 0 9 ,5 0 0 6 ,5 4 9
4 . S o d ia a l F r a n c e d a ir y  p r o d u c ts 2 ,5 6 5 ,0 0 0 n .a . n .a .
5 . M ilk  M a rq u e U K d a ir y  p r o d u c ts 2 ,3 9 3 ,0 0 0 1 8 ,0 0 0 3 0 0
6 . C e b e c o  
H a n d e ls r a n d
N L in p u ts  a n d
a g r ic u l tu r a l
p r o d u c t io n
2 ,1 9 0 ,0 0 0 5 0 4 ,4 1 6
7 . F r ie s la n d  
D a i r y  F o o d s
N L d a ir y  p r o d u c ts 2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 4 ,8 0 0 7 ,4 9 0
8. S o c o p a F r a n c e M e a t 1 ,9 9 0 ,0 0 0 n .a . n .a .
9 . R H G  
H a n n o v e r
G e r m a n y m u lt i ­
f u n c t io n a l
1 ,7 9 0 ,0 0 0 2 6 0 2 ,9 4 6
10. C o b e r e o N L d a ir y  p r o d u c ts 1 ,7 6 0 ,0 0 0 9 ,2 0 0 3 ,6 6 8
1 l .M D  F o o d s D e n m a r k d a ir y  p r o d u c ts 1 ,6 8 1 ,0 0 0 8 ,9 1 9 3 ,6 7 8
12. D a n is h  
C r o w n  *
D e n m a r k m e a t 1 ,5 7 6 ,8 0 0 1 2 ,5 6 0 6 ,9 6 5
13. U N C A A # F r a n c e in p u ts ,  m e a t 1 ,5 2 7 ,9 0 0 n .a . n .a .
14. T h e  I r ish  
D a i r y  B o a r d
I r e l a n d d a ir y  p r o d u c ts 1 ,5 2 3 ,3 0 0 71 2 ,0 1 0
15. A v o n m o r e I r e l a n d d a ir y  p r o d u c ts 1 ,4 9 4 ,3 0 0 1 3 ,2 4 5 6 ,4 2 6
16. K e r ry  G r o u p I r e l a n d d a ir y  p r o d u c ts 1 ,4 6 3 ,3 0 0 6 ,0 0 0 6 ,4 0 7
17. D u m e c o * N L m e a t 1 ,4 0 1 ,0 0 0 1 6 ,5 0 0 3 ,0 0 0
18. V a l io F in la n d d a ir y  p r o d u c ts 1 ,3 9 7 ,0 0 0 4 7 5 ,1 0 1
19. A r ia S w e d e n d a ir y  p r o d u c t s 1 ,3 6 9 ,0 0 0 1 0 ,3 6 5 6 ,0 2 0
20.
G r e e n e r y  A 'T N *
N L f ru i t  a n d
v e g e ta b le s ,
a u c t io n s
1 ,3 4 6 ,6 0 0 1 7 ,8 5 0 5 ,2 7 4









































































































Belgium 18 - - - 60 - 30 75 85
Denmark 96 66 54 56 98 - 59 70-80 70-80
Germany 27 27 - - 48 80 30-50 20-40 55-65
Greece 3 2 15 2 20 - 49 57 3
Spain 5 6 14 18 18 20 17 37 12
France 85 30 30 25 47 16 68 40 25
Ireland 66 15-20 20 - 99.5 - 57 14.3 17.5
Italy* 13 12 35 8 40 6.5 20 43 8
Lux. 35 25 - - 81 - 75 - -
Netherlands* 40 31 10 13 84 63 65 85 67
Austria 20 25 70 - 90 100 60 18 28
Portugal - - - - - - - - -
Finland 66 64 82 60 96 - 48 - -
Sweden 78 76 - 33 99 - 75 20 50
UK 28 - - 25 98 - 21 25 34
» 1994
Source: The Situation of Agriculture in the European Community, 1997
At the EU level, the umbrella organisation for agricultural cooperatives is the 
COGECA (General Committee for Agricultural Cooperation in the EU).12 In 
1994 COGECA represented through its 16 national association members some 
33,000 agricultural and fisheries cooperatives in the EU. The cooperatives were 
composed of more than 14,000,000 cooperative members. These supplied over 
half of the farm inputs in the EU, and were responsible for marketing and 
processing over 60% of output.
4. Producer Organisations in the EU
The EC Commission has always been in favour of measures to improve the 
bargaining power of farmers in the market place, in particular, by encouraging 
the formation of producer organisations.13 The attitude of the Commission was 
also influenced by the positive experience of certain of the member states with 
such organisations, as, for example, the Groupements de producteurs in France 
and the Veilingen in the Netherlands.
l2COGECA maintains a joint staff with COPA (Committee of Professional Agricultural 
Organisations which is the main federation of farmers’ groups in Brussels), and CEJA (the 
European Council of young farmers). COCEGA, together with COPA was formed in 1959 at 
the bequest of the EC Commission to help coordinate farm policy at the EC level. It 
participates in the agricultural decision-making process of the EU and has regular contacts 
with the EC Commission, the Agriculture Committee of the European Parliament, and the 
secretariat of the Council of Ministers, and Ecosoc.
l3Such measures were considered an exception to Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome which 




























































































The first measures granting financial assistance for the formation and 
operation of voluntary producer organisations were introduced in the fruit and 
vegetable sector (Reg. 159/66).14 Subsequently measures to encourage the 
formation of producer groups were introduced for other sectors,15 but it was not 
until 1978 that an overall Regulation (1360/78) on "producer groups and 
associations thereof' was introduced.16 This measure was initially conceived for 
Italy, but was in the event was extended to certain French Departments (mainly 
in the South), French overseas Departments, and Belgium. The coverage varied 
by area, but included products such as citrus fruit, wine and grapes, olives, 
cereals and live cattle.
The present legislation dates from 1996 with Reg. 2200/96, which sets out 
the objectives of producer organisations as being:
• managing supply and organising it better in the face of increasingly
monopolistic demand;
• recognition of the role of the market; 17
• taking account of environmental concerns, and
• reinforcing product standards.
Producer groups are encouraged to join together in inter-professional 
associations, and together these were granted powers to organise market 
support. They are responsible for determining rules regarding minimum prices
14This legislation was consolidated by Reg. 1035/72, according to which the aims of such 
organisations were:
i) to help to concentrate supply and stabilise producer prices;
ii) to assist members in the presentation and marketing of produce;
iii) unless the requirement is waived, to sell the members’ total output, in respect of which 
they joined the group, and
iv) to adopt measures to improve quality and to adapt supply to market requirements.
Member states were granted the power to grant launching aids to producer groups in the first 
three years of their establishment (extended to 7 years for Mediterranean countries in 1978, 
given the particular difficulties of their agriculture). Aid was granted as a certain percentage 
(descending from 3% to 1% in the 1972 Regulation) of the value of produce supplied by the 
members.
^Regulations were introduced to encourage the formation of producer groups in fisheries 
(1970), hops (1971), silkworm production (1975), and olive oil (1978).
16According to Regulation 1360/78, aid was given to organisations recognised by individual 
member states and was recognition was conditional on the organisation having a certain 
minimum size, being able to implement norms for the production and marketing of 
agricultural products, and marketing all the produce of members, or at least deciding on norms 
for doing so.
The Italian legislation (674/78) envisaged two further roles for producer organisations: 
participation in drawing up national and regional agricultural plans, and representation of their 
members, in particular in agreeing contracts with downstream firms and their associations.
17It was widely recognised that the policy of withdrawals had the negative tendency of 




























































































and terms of compensation for withdrawn products, and for the management of 
withdrawals. Producer organisations therefore play a key role in administering 
the system.
EU financing for these activities is conditional on recognition, and under 
Regulation 2200/96, the criteria for recognising producer organisations became 
more restrictive. Producer organisations must have a minimum number of 
members,18 contol a certain quantity of output, and respect certain statutory and 
technical conditions. Producers must belong to just one producer organisation 
and (with a few exceptions, such as allowances for direct sales) sell all their 
produce through it.
Producer organisations are required to set up operational programmes to 
improve product quality, marketing, develop environmentally-sound cultivation 
practices and so on. Approved programmes are part-financed by FEOGA (on a 
50:50 basis).19 Withdrawal operations only receive Community financing if the 
operational programme has been approved.
The experience of EU member states illustrates that the creation of 
producer organisations has generally gone more smoothly and their operation 
has been more effective where there is a tradition of cooperatives.20 As 
Ledermann (1998) describes, the fact that many producer organisations sprang 
from cooperatives helps to explain the success of producer organisations in 
certain French regions such as Brittany, Nord Picardie, and Val de Loire.
In some cases producer organisations have been set up with no real 
commercial role, but simply to to carry out withrawals and receive subsidies in
,8Recognising that previous measures had limited success in the consolidation of supply, the 
later measures also allowed national legislation to fix a higher minimum thresholds for 
recognition of producer organisations. Countries such as the Netherlands, France and Spain 
adopted the thresholds of the EC Regulation, but Italy fixed far higher levels. To qualify for 
recognition, Italian producer organisations were to have 100 rather than the minimum of 40 
members specified by Reg. 412/97, and a turnover of 10 rather than 1.5 ECU. Prior to the 
1997 Regulation a large number (148) of relatively small producer organisations were 
operating in the Italian fruit and vegetable sector, controlling about 30% of production, but 
subsequently the number fell to 65 and they controlled only 19% of the production of fruit and 
vegetables. Moreover, only 49 of these producer organisations were able to present the 
operating programmes required to obtain Community financing, and very few of these were in 
the South, where 68% of fruit and vegetables are produced. In contrast, the share of fruit and 
vegetable production covered by the 1997 EC Regulation was 70% in the Netherlands, 42% in 
France, and 25% in Spain (Bruni, 1999).
19 Up to 4%, increased to 4.5% from 1999, of the value of marketed production.
20 At the EU level it was always stressed that the role of producer organisations was to support 
rather than substitute cooperatives, but in practice the relationship between producer 





























































































consequence.21 As a result their functions were reduced to the bureaucratic 
aspects of implementing Community norms.22 Producer organisations can either 
operate directly, buying produce from their members and taking part in market 
operations, or they can rely on their members to carry out these actions, 
provided common objectives are met. As a result, decisions concerning the 
quantity of production to market, the programming of production, or even 
information about the amount of production being released on the market over 
time often remain the prerogative of members. Where producer groups number 
cooperatives among their members, they tend to rely on these cooperatives to 
carry out actual marketing. As a result, it is often the cooperative members 
rather than the producer group who are in a stronger position to realise the 
objectives listed above. Not surprisingly many producer organisations 
encourage the formation of cooperatives to render their operations more 
effective (Malevolti, 1989).
The creation of cooperatives in sectors such as fruit and vegetables in 
Cyprus could therefore help to render the future operation of Cypriot producer 
groups in an enlarged EU more effective, transforming them from simple units 
for administering Community norms, into organisations capable of 
concentrating and controlling supply, and improving its quality.
5. The Difficulties Encountered by Agricultural Cooperatives in the EU
It is frequently argued that the effectiveness of cooperatives is undermined 
because their specific characteristics create conflicts with regard to governance 
structures, residual claims and the ability to ensure adequate financing for 
capital investments.23 It is useful now to provide a brief review of the various 
explanations offered as to why such conflicts might arise.24
Cooperatives are collectively owned and, as Olson (1965) described, 
where property rights are collective or unassigned, a free-riding problem, may 
occur.25 For example, non-members may be able to capture the benefits of terms 
of trade negotiated by members of the cooperative. A more complex form of 
free riding may arise because, in general, a member leaving a cooperative is not
21See Ledemann (1998) for the case of France, Aldanondo Ochoa (1998) for Spain and 
Malevolti (1989) or Rama and Lanciotti (1997) for Italy.
22This is a problem, in particular, in sectors such as olive oil, or the production of tomatoes for 
processing.
23See, for instance, Gow and Swinnen (1997).
24For a more detailed account of this issue see the taxonomy of problem sets provided by 
Cook (1995).
25Current members of the cooperative use resources for their own benefit and the attribution 
of property rights is not adequate to ensure that current members bear or receive the full costs 




























































































entitled to take his full contribution to collective capital. As a result there is a 
common property problem (Vitaliano, 1983), and members will be reluctant to 
contribute to investments whose benefits are not appropriable in proportion to 
their costs.
The application of the property-rights approach to cooperatives owes 
much to the pioneering work of Furubotn and Pejovich (1970) and 
Vanek(1977). Independently these authors identified a disincentive to finance 
investment with internal funds when members of the cooperative do not have 
individual and transferable ownership rights in the assets of the cooperative. 
Rather than using the current surplus to finance capital investment, workers 
prefer to distribute as much as possible to themselves in the form of wages or 
bonuses.
This disincentive to retain funds for investment purposes may be 
exacerbated by the horizon problem which arises because the member has a 
claim to returns on an asset only as long as he is a member of the cooperative, 
and this may not coincide with the productive life of the asset.
A portfolio problem may arise when there is no secondary market for 
shares in the cooperative (Vitaliano, 1983). If ownership rights are not tradable, 
patrons cannot achieve a portfolio of investments which reflects their risk 
preferences, and this may increase risk aversion towards investments.26 Lack of 
transferability means that members hold suboptimal portfolios, and those who 
are forced to accept more risk than they prefer may encourage the decision­
makers of the cooperative to reduce risks, even where this means lower 
expected returns on investments (Cook, 1995).
According to the principal-agency approach, it is frequently argued that 
problems for the governance of cooperatives may arise from the separation of 
ownership and control giving rise to diverging objectives of the members of a 
cooperative and its management.
Coordination of the activities of a cooperative are carried out according 
to the organisational arrangements set out in its statute. According to the 
democratic principle, members should be directly and exclusively involved in 
decision-making, but in practice members are generally represented by a board 
of directors. A control problem may arise as a result of diverging interests 
between the board of directors (principal), and the management (agency).27
26Relatively poor worker-managers may also prefer projects with lower risk.
27The case is somewhat different for investor-owned firms. In small firms the owner is 
generally also the manager so corporate governance is relatively straightforward. The 
difficulty arises with larger firms where there is a divorce between ownership and control. 



























































































The influence-cost problem may arise if the cooperative engages in 
diverse activities and members have a wide range of objectives. Influence 
activities arise when organisational decisions affect the distribution of wealth 
among members of the organisation, and some members try to influence the 
decision to their benefit. The scale of influence costs will depend on the degree 
of central authority, the decision-making procedures, and the degree of 
homogeneity or conflict in the interests of members (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992).
An extensive literature has emerged on the theoretical aspects of 
cooperatives attempting to illustrate how a different structure of property rights, 
and, in particular, the introduction of tradable shares in cooperatives or the 
conversion of cooperatives in joint-stock companies helps to overcome such 
drawbacks.28
On the problem of ensuring adequate funding for investment, empirical 
studies of cooperatives do not find conclusive evidence that capital/output or 
capital/labour ratios are lower than in investor-owned firms (Bonin, Jone& and 
Putterman (1993)). However, the real stumbling block to carrying out such 
comparisons probably lies in the absence of firm-level data on twin 
organisations over a reasonable number of years.
In practice to meet this difficulty agricultural cooperatives have 
introduced a wide variety of financial arrangements.29 Many have recourse to 
outside investors, even though this may run the risk of loss of control. To 
reduce such a risk, in Spain, for example, a distinction has been introduced 
between full members of the cooperative, supporters and collaborators.
Some agricultural cooperatives have introduced bonds (in the 
Netherlands for example), or transferable shares, while others have been 
converted in joint stock companies (in Britain and Germany). Shareholders may 
be members of the cooperative, or, in some cases, outsiders such as other 
cooperatives, federations of cooperatives, institutional investors, or private 
individuals. In some countries (such as Sweden) legislation has been introduced 
to permit at least a part of collective capital to be divided into individual 
components. In a few cases arrangements have been introduced to reimburse
American model relies on efficient financial markets, with shareholder bids, and the prospect 
of takeovers as a means of disciplining managers. The German-Japanese model relies more on 
the relations between firms and their owners (and, in particular, banks which may hold a 
significant amount of shares) to monitor the behaviour of managers and performance of the 
firm.
28See, for example, Bonin, Jones and Putterman (1993), or van Bekkum and van Dijk eds. 
(1997).




























































































departing members of cooperatives for past contributions to capital by an 
amount equivalent to the future value of investments.
Turning to the argument that cooperatives with a large number of 
members encounter difficulties of coordination and control, this would seem to 
bode ill for cooperatives in the EU, given the high number of mergers and 
acquisition of other firms which has occurred recently. However, in an 
extensive survey of cooperatives in each of the EU member States, van 
Bekkum, van Dijk et al (1997) do not find evidence for this conclusion. Rather, 
they argue that larger cooperatives with more members are generally better able 
to deliver the goods, and thereby ensure the loyalty of their members.
The legislation on cooperatives varies considerably between member 
states, with differences with regard to tax concessions, subsidised credit, norms 
regulating the structure and behaviour of cooperatives, competition policy and 
so on. Such differences may create difficulties for the functioning of the Single 
Market.
Some Member States (and, in particular, the Southern counties, Greece, 
Italy, Spain and Portugal) offer a various financial incentives for the creation of 
cooperatives. This may encourage the establishment of cooperatives which 
simply exist "on paper" to benefit from the various advantages of public 
support. According to various authors,30 31this was a major problem in Southern 
Italy, where incentives such as tax concessions, subsidised interest rates, and 
grants were a major reason for rapid increase in cooperatives, in particular, in 
the 1970s.3'
A key to increasing the competitiveness of cooperatives in a changing 
market environment is to ensure that management capabilities are adequate. 
Remuneration should be adequate to attract skilled and motivated management, 
and attempts should be made to judge the effectiveness of management 
performance. The introduction of shares representing the individual member’s 
capital investment with the payment of dividends on these shares on the basis of 
business performance would also act as an indicator of the degree of success of 
management.
In practice in many cooperatives equal treatment for members is 
interpreted to mean equal pricing or charging the same price per unit. With the
30See, for example, Saccomandi (1984) and Giacomini, Bonomi, and Martorana (1996).
31In 1951 55% of all cooperatives in Italy were in the North, but the share fell to 25% by 1990 
when the percentage of all agricultural cooperatives in the South rose to 51% (statistics from 
the Ministry of Labour and Social Security). Cooperatives in the Mezzogiomo were 
frequently also characterised by weak organisation, and low participation in associations 




























































































increasing emphasis on quality it is necessary to make adequate allowances for 
product differentiation, which may imply equitable, rather than equal treatment. 
Similarly, it may be necessary to take into account the fact that larger members 
of the cooperative generally receive the same price as smaller patrons, though 
they frequently impose lower costs or contribute more to the net income of the 
cooperative (van Bekkum and van Dijk eds., 1997).
Given the growing concern of consumers with the safety and quality of 
foodstuffs, cooperatives should be increasingly concerned with market 
orientation, imposing tighter conditions and controls on their members. In view 
of the more demanding requirements of processors and end-users, at times it 
may also be necessary for cooperatives to introduce more flexible arrangements 
with non-members, for instance, buying raw material from non-members or 
establishing autonomous subsidiaries supervised by the holding cooperative for 
marketing and international operations. According to van Bekkum and van Dijk 
eds., (1997), such subsidiaries may offer advantages in terms of better financial 
control, risk reduction, access to market activities, and responsive decision­
making.
6. The Agricultural Sector in Cyprus
In 1997 agricultural production in Cyprus accounted for roughly 5% of GDP 
and 10 % of employment,32 compared to the equivalent EU(15) figures of 2.0% 
and 5.1% respectively for 1997 (see Table 4). The share of agriculture in 
Cypriot employment was as high as 45% in 1960. The food-processing industry 
in Cyprus accounted for a further 13% of GDP and 18% of employment in 
1997.
In 1997 crops accounted for 50% of gross agricultural output, and about 
66% of value added, while livestock products amounted to 30-36% of gross 
output and 20-25% of value added. Table 5 provides statistics on production for 
some of the main product groups.33
32Unless otherwise stated, the statistics in this Section are taken from Government of Cyprus 
(1998) and Commission of the European Communities 1999.
33The main field crops are barley and fodder crops. Potatoes account for a large part of 
vegetable production, and pork and poultry are the most important form of meat production. 





























































































Table 4: The Agricultural Sector in the EU and Cyprus (1997)
EU Cyprus
Agricultural land 1000 ha 134,261 200*
average size of holdings ha 17.4 3.5
full-time equivalent 7,434 29
workers in agriculture
1000
% agriculture in 5.0% 10%
employment
% agriculture in GDP 2.0% 5%
Source: Eurostat and Government of Cyprus (1998) 
*1996
Table 5: Production, Trade and Self-Sufficiency of Main Agricultural Products in
Cyprus) 1996)
(lOOOt) cereals vege- fruit and milk and meat and vegetable
tables and processed milk meat oils and
their fruit products products their
products products
Production 141 316 337 180 90 11
Imports 593 106 22 32 4 58
Exports 3 19 145 24 3 0
Self-sufficiency 22.68% n/a n/a 88.2% 93.27%
1991-5 (%) 




Of a total land area of 925,000 hectares, agricultural land was only about 
200,000 hectares in 1996.34 Irrigated land, which permits the intensive 
production of fruit trees, vines, citrus fruit and vegetables amounts to only 20% 
of agricultural land.35 Although irrigated crops cover such a small percentage of 
cultivated land, in terms of value they account for 60-70% of total crop 
production (Gans, 1996). The scarcity of water, and the falling annual 
precipitation represent major problems.
34The remaining land is arid, uncultivated or forest.




























































































A further difficulty is the small size of farms. The average size of 
holdings in 1997 was 3.5 hectares,36 and 30% of all holdings were less than one 
hectare, a further 30% of 1-2.5 hectares, and 24% between 2.5 and 8 hectares. 
Moreover, the average size of holding has been falling (from 4.58 ha in 1977), 
largely as a result of the inheritance system.
In addition, farms tend to be fragmented and dispersed, and on average 
each Cypriot holding was divided into 4.5 plots. Often these plots are scattered 
all over the village, or even in distant villages, and in some cases are even 
without road access. Not only do farmers take time to travel between such plots, 
but their small size hinders mechanisation and the possibility of exploiting 
economies of scale.
Part-time farming is negatively correlated with the size of the holding, 
and is a dominant and feature of Cypriot agriculture. There has been an upward 
trend in land purchase by town dwellers.
As Gans (1996) describes, although almost all land is privately owned, a 
number of legal problems relating to property rights arise. In 1985 some 22% of 
land was owned by more than one person, largely as a result of the inheritance 
system and land tenure law which prevent the division of plots below a certain 
minimum size. In some cases there is separate ownership of land, trees and 
water on a single plot, while in other cases land lacks title deeds. There is also a 
lack of legislation covering long-term leasing of land.
7. Agricultural Trade
Agricultural products account for 20% of all exports, and the EU is the main 
trading partner, and was the destination of 87% of Cypriot agricultural exports 
in 1997. Within the EU, Britain is the main destination of agricultural exports, 
as, at least initially in the 1960s, many exports arose to meet the demand of 
Cypriot expatriates there (Gans, 1996).
Irrigated crops figure strongly in exports, and, in particular, potatoes, 
citrus products, fresh grapes and vegetables. Processed products account for a 
further 11% of exports and include processed fruit and vegetables, wine and 
spirits and milk products.37 According to the Government of Cyprus (1999, p.7), 
the geographical position of Cyprus should offer an advantage in permitting 
out-of-season exports to the EU.
36Not only is this is below the EU average of 17.4 ha, but it is also below that of all EU 
countries, with 4.5 ha for Greece, 6.9 ha for Italy, 38.5 ha in France and 70.1 ha in the UK.




























































































Cyprus remains a net importer of agricultural products, and in particular, 
of cereals, beef, lamb, milk products and processed food items.38 In years of bad 
harvest such as 1991, the overall agricultural trade balance tends to be negative, 
as exports raw agricultural products may fail to offset imports of processed 
products (Gans, 1996). Livestock production is heavily dependent on imported 
foodstuffs, and, in contrast to fruit and vegetables, can be regarded essentially 
as an import-substituting sector.
Cyprus signed a customs union agreement with the EU in 1973, which 
entered into its second and final stage from 1987. As a result, tariffs on 
agricultural products covered by the agreement have been abolished, while 
preferential treatment has been granted for products not included in the customs 
union.39 When Cyprus joins the EU it will therefore be moving from a customs 
union (which does not cover many agricultural products) to an (albeit 
imperfect) single market.40
As a result of the 1994 GATT Uruguay Round Agreement, the former 
system of quotas or import prohibitions for agricultural products was abolished, 
and tariffication (i.e. the transformation of non-tariff barriers into tariffs) was 
implemented. The resulting bound rates are similar to those of the EU, though 
in some cases higher.41
8. Adapting Cypriot Agricultural Policy to the EU
In the past agricultural policy in Cyprus was highly interventionist, but in recent 
years there have been attempts to bring measures increasingly in line with EU 
market organisations.
The Cypriot government sets wholesale and retail prices and margins for 
many agricultural products,42 and statutory marking boards control the internal 
and external marketing of products, such as milk, olive oil, carrots, potatoes, 
and beetroot.43 Direct subsidies are given to various products, while indirect
38See Table 5.
39Tariffs have been abolished on many products included in Annex IV to the agreement, such 
as fruit, vegetables and wine. Cyprus has granted improved market access for products such as 
cereals, oils, milk and meat products and fish, and has applied a preferential tariff on all other 
products not included in the customs union (Government of Cyprus, 1999)
40On the enlargement question many observors tend to assume erroneously that the applicant 
country starts from a free trade situation.
■“ European Commission (1998).
42The Ministry of Commerce and Industry also fixes maximum trade margins for wholesaler 
and retailers on products not covered by government agencies or cooperatives.
43The aims of marketing boards include the creation of more orderly and more economical 
marketing structures, ensuring continuity of supply, improving quality, and increasing 




























































































support to agriculture is also provided through the supply of subsidised 
irrigation water.44
When Cyprus joins the EU, it will have to abolish the various state- 
controlled commissions and marketing boards as exclusive marketing 
arrangements are forbidden in the EU. In the past, the treatment of marketing 
boards when a country joins the Community has proved a contentious issue.
This was the case for Britain’s milk marketing boards which had been 
established in the 1930s and bought nearly all milk sold from farms to sell it on 
to processors. The boards were also active in the improvement of quality 
standards. Other Member States that feared that the milk marketing boards 
could exploit their monopolistic position and price pooling policy as a means to 
undercut the price of imports. In 1978 a political compromise was reached45 
which entailed that "a Member State might be authorized to grant to an 
organisation representing at least 80% of the number and at least 50% of the 
production of the milk producers...a) the exclusive right to buy from 
producers...b) the right to equalise the prices paid to producers". (Harris, 
Swinbank and Wilkenson, 1983). In 1994 the milk marketing boards passed 
from being government-funded bodies to becoming autonomous cooperatives 
representing all producers in England, Scotland and Wales.46 47A similar option 
could be introduced in Cyprus.
As an EU member Cyprus would have to end the subsidisation of 
irrigation water which would violate EU competition law. In addition, subsidies 
on cereals and hay, the direct subsidy to vine growers, the fixed margins for 
retail and wholesale prices would have to be eliminated or restructured to bring 
them into line with the CAP (Pattichis, 1999).
Following the 1993 European Commission’s Opinion on Cyprus’s 
application for membership, working groups were established to assess what 
measures were necessary to bring Cypriot agriculture in line with the acquis.” 
In 1997 this led to the beginning of a harmonisation programme, and to a 
process of more systematic screening of the acquis. Emphasis was placed on the 
process of adopting EU quality standards and health regulations, on measures to 
increase productivity, and on the necessary institutional changes, including the 
introduction of CAP-like mechanisms for organising markets.
44Gans (1996) estimated that farmers pay no more than one third of average unit cost for 
water.
45This entailed a modification to Reg. 804/68
46These cooperatives are Milk Marque, Scottish Milk and United Milk Producers.




























































































As an EU member Cyprus would qualify for transfers from the 
Community Budget through the structural funds.48 EU structural measures 
related to agriculture include those aimed at promoting rural development, more 
environmentally-friendly agriculture, early retirement, the structural adjustment 
of farms, and forestry measures.49 50
The reform of the CAP agreed at the Berlin European Council of March 
1999 (also known as "Agenda 2000" which was the title of the Commission’s 
initial proposals of 1997) entails reductions in intervention price of 15% for 
cereals and dairy products, and of 20% for beef. Farmers in the EU (15) would 
be partially compensated for these price cuts through direct payments. Milk 
quotas would continue until 2006 and compulsory set-aside (i.e. the obligation 
to leave a certain percentage of land idle) would be set at a default rate of 
10%.»
There has been considerable debate about how far (or whether) direct 
income payments should be extended to farmers in countries joining the EU. At 
least initially such payments were introduced as compensation for the loss of 
income resulting from the reductions in price support resulting from the 1992 
MacSharry reform and the Berlin Agreement. At first the Commission argued 
that farmers in applicant countries will generally not experience price cuts and
48These are transfers to the less favoured areas and sections of the population of the EU. The 
structural funds are the European Social Fund, the European Regional Development Fund, the 
Guidance Section of FEOGA (the European Fund for Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee, 
and the Guidance Instrument for Fisheries. A related measure is the Coherance Fund for 
member states whose per capita GDP is less than 90% of the EU average.
49Over the 1994-1999 period such measures fell under Objectives 1, 5a and 5b of the 
Structural Funds, but under Agenda 2000 the number of Objectives is reduced to three. 
Objective 1 applies to regions whose GDP is less than 75% of the EU average. Objective 2 
concerns regions with major economic and social restructuring needs. Objective 3 is a 
"horizontal" measure concerned with the development of human capital, and applying in all 
regions not covered by Objectives 1 and 2. Its aim would be to help member states adapt and 
modernise their education, training and employment.
According to the financial perspective for the period 2000-2006, the structural funds will 
account for 31% of the EC Budget and 0.46% of EU GDP. On average GDP per capita in the 
applicant countries is lower than in the EU(15). To limit the scale of transfers from the 
Community Budget, the Berlin Agreement therefore placed a ceiling on the size of the transfer 
to countries joining the EU of 4% of the GDP of the recipient country.
50It could prove difficult to implement and enforce supply-control measures such as the 
compulsory set-aside of land and production quotas on milk in the applicant countries. In 
Cyprus and (following privatisation) the CEECs many holdings are small and fragmented, and 
are often owned by non-farming landowners. Small farms can opt for the simplified regime 
(which applies to farmers requesting compensation for less than 92 tonnes of cereals) and so 
avoid the obligation to take land out of production. This could create tensions and render set- 





























































































°  s^ h o u ld  jìb^benefit from direct payments,51 and only in early 2000 was the 
.possibility ofc’extending those payments to the applicant countries voiced.
BIBV&
Even after the Berlin Agreement EU agricultural producer prices are 
likely to be higher in than those in Cyprus and on world markets.52 When the 
CAP is extended to Cyprus, farm gate prices for many products are therefore 
likely to increase. If these higher farm gate prices are passed on as higher retail 
prices they will entail an additional burden for consumers.53 As a net importer 
of cereals and livestock Cyprus will also have to pay higher prices for these 
imports. These price increases are likely to affect poorer households most as 
they generally spend a higher percentage of their income on food. Against this, 
however, it is necessary to consider the expected positive impact on income EU 
accession is expected to have in stimulating economic growth overall.
The higher farm gate prices expected as a result of adopting the CAP 
could also have a negative impact on the food industry in Cyprus. If the higher 
prices for agricultural inputs paid by the food industry cannot be passed on to 
consumers because of competition from foreign, or more efficient processors, 
some firms may be forced out of business. 54 At the same time in an enlarged 
single EU market Cypriot food industry will have to compete with EU firms, 
and "some of the the world’s most efficient food industries operate in the EU 
15" (European Commission, 1997, p.15).
Squeezed between higher prices for their agricultural inputs, and 
increased competitive pressures from EU firms, it is imperative for the Cypriot 
food industry to adjust and restructure in order to raise its competitiveness. This 
restructuring could involve cutting costs and increasing efficiency, or 
improving quality and increasing value added. Higher farm gate prices are 
likely to have consequences for the marketing strategies of Cypriot farmers. 
Also here, improvements in efficiency are the key to competing in an enlarged 
EU market and it is in this context that the promotion of cooperatives could 
play a role.
9. The Experience of Cooperatives in Cyprus
Cooperatives have played an important role in Cyprus in the provision of credit 
and inputs and in the marketing of products (see Table 6). It is estimated that
51See, for example, the 1995 Agricultural Strategy Paper (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1995), and Agenda 2000 (Commission of the European Communities, 1997).
52Cypriot cereal prices represent an exception as producer prices are higher than in the EU, 
though consumer and import prices are lower than those of the EU.
53In welfare terms, consumer surplus falls while producer surplus increases. For estimates of 
the size of these effects in the case of Cyprus see Pattichis (1999).




























































































cooperatives account for the provision of about 80% of fertilisers and roughly a 
third of chemicals. 55 They also market about one third of all fruit and 
vegetables, and are consulted by wholesalers in the setting of prices.
Table 6: Number of Registered Cooperatives in Cyprus by Type of Activity (1997)






- processing of agricultural 
products
6 1.3%
- processing of non- 3
agricultural products 0.6%
Retailing 58 12.2%
Credit and savings 363 76.3%
Insurance 1 0.2%
Other services* 13 2.7%
Total 476 100%
Source: Government of Cyprus, 1999
* These include cooperatives for a medical fund, government lottery tcket salesmen, land 
leasing, water provision, transport and tourist services, computer servisces, and concentration 
of cereals.
Credit for agriculture comes from commercial banks (about 71%), the village 
cooperative societies (27%), and, to a much lesser extent, the Cyprus 
Development Bank.56 The village cooperative societies are the main source of 
credit for small farmers. The cooperative societies are obliged to make deposits 
in the Central Cooperative Bank, while the latter grants subsidized long-term 
credit to farmers. However, there are frequent complaints about slow and 
complex administrative procedures, and delays in the disbursement of 
subsidised credit.
The SEDIGEP Cooperative Marketing Union plays an important role in 
the marketing of citrus fruits, grapes and watermelons. In 1999 it was composed 
of 3568 individual members and 22 cooperatives. The SEDIGEP is responsible 
for about half of all grape exports and 25-30% of those of citrus fruits, with 
most of the remaining export shares of these products being handled by private 
firms. Before the marketing boards for potatoes, carrots and beetroots, the 
SEDIGEP was also reponsible for marketing these products, and it is still 
actively involved in their packaging for export.
55The statistics in this paragraph are taken from Government of Cyprus (1999).
56This is a government institution which does not accept deposits and does business 




























































































Table 7 indicates the scale of activity of some of the main cooperatives 
involved in the processing of agricultural products in Cyprus.
Table 7: Some of the main cooperatives involved in the processing of agricultural
products in Cyprus
Turnover in 1997 
(CY£ million)
Market share
The Cooperative for the 
Marketing of Vine Products
5.9m. 30%
The Cooperative for the 
Processing of Agricultural 
Produce
3.6m. n.a.
The Cooperative of 
Tobacco Producers
lm. n.a.
The Cooperative for 
Animal Feedstuffs
3.3m. 14%
n.a. - not available
Source: Government of Cyprus, 1999
10. How cooperatives could help Cyprus to prepare for EU accession
It is useful to summarise the various ways in which measures to favour the 
creation of cooperatives might facilitate the process of EU accession:
• overcoming the disavantages of small, fragmented farms by helping to 
concentrate supply, stabilise producer prices, and increase the bargaining 
strength of farmers;
• permitting farmers to exploit economies of scale and increasing their 
capacity to compete on an enlarged market. This could help to offset the 
negative consequences of higher prices for consumers and the food 
industries in Cyprus.
• easing the process of adopting the acquis and, in particular, the task of 
taking on EU standards with regard to food safety, and health concerns;
• improving quality and increasing market orientation, thereby helping to 
meet the growing requests of consumers for variety, convenience and 
specialised regional foodstuffs;
• improving standards for grading, packing and storage;
• replacing the marketing boards;
• ensuring that producer organisations in sectors such as fruit and 
vegetables operate more effectively.





























































































• ensuring that government incentives do not lead to the creation of 
cooperatives which exist on paper, but which fail to operate effectively in 
practice;
• overcoming the problems of corporate governance which may arise 
from diverging objectives of the owners (members) and managers of the 
cooperative;
• treating members in a fair, though not necessarily identical manner;
• improving the quality of management;
• increasing market orientation;
• ensuring adequate funds for investment.
As the discussion of the experience of agricultural cooperatives in the EU has 
shown, many of these disadvantages can be avoided by introducing an 
appropriate legislative framework, by encouraging cooperatives to adopt 
innovations in their organisational structure such as such as transferable shares, 
or external financing, and by attaching higher priority to the quality of 
management, and the need for market orientation.
Susan Senior Nello 
Università degli Studi di Siena 
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